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]M ITiH UTAllCOURTnr U W M K 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
DAVID CARL REED, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo. 20050670-CA 
^ , . i ^ k i KXNAL M ATEM1M 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Attempted Child 
Kidnapping, a first degree lelom. in \k.iaiion ui i lai i ^ ^ e . V i ; l . . s '> -un.^) 
* ii^i;-! District, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon 
this Court pursuant t<> i Uth ( ode Ann * :• JaotJHi <-*</_:». see .\uuenu.. 
< J U U L J 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred by ruling the Male presenteu sui iiciem 
."* >•.!•'' ei " (1e<M\\* f i .,,1 ^ i.- ;iuenipted child kidnapping under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1 (2003) and § 76-4-Ml iSupp. 2005V 
Standard of Review: In sullieienex ol the evidences cases, u . i oun - v\ KV 
u ie e\ ideik. L u . w i n ! ! »M 
favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124,1115, 63 P.3d 94. 
It "will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." Id (citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's 
decision this Court still has the right to review the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the verdict. The fabric of evidence 
against the defendant must cover the gap between the 
presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch 
the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not 
mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a 
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. 
Id (quoting Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant David Carl Reed (Reed) preserved his argument that the trial court erred 
in ruling the State presented sufficient evidence to support a first degree felony 
conviction for attempted child kidnapping at R. 226:94-98 (motion to dismiss entered at 
close of State's case) (Addendum B); see State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,fl 1,^ 14, 10 P.3d 
346 ("As a general rule, to ensure that the trial court addresses the sufficiency of the 
evidence, a defendant must request that the court do so."). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal. Their text is 
provided in full in Addendum C. 
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Utah Code Ann... § 76-2-103(1) (2003) - Culpable Mental. State Definitions; 
• "• Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1 (2003) - Child Kidnapping. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
R e c < • *li . . ••*•••• m ; M » ! * K idnappiiii:. 
a first degree felony; in \ iolation of I Uah Code Ann, §§ 76-5-301.! m\d 76-4-1 (:: K * 
A jury trial was held on February 2-3, 2(iw ^ i ---/4. 2 _ J - 2 4 . 2Jo-- . m i ii ^ opening 
Slaienn-Mi. Reed adr ;,i * ; '• * •- . \J ' " <l\c\u\ • =• 
he was not guilty of attempted ehild kidnapping. R. 226:1 (>. He explained that he "did 
not open the car door. I le did iu»i leh | A.^ liL) l\>ik^ (i\>ikv. ., m me demanding way or 
air. ' » ^ . • , .i. • ' . . . : ; . - '\P. hniisi • •-» her t to 
kidnap her, not to [seize] or confine or detain or transport her."' h i at 17. 
At the close of the State's case, Reed "move[dJ the Court to uiMinss the case 
a g a h i * - M p V i e n e - -^ • <-: • o r ' ;• ' i i g .* ; m v j t-n-i./ • • is. 
at 94. He raised two arguments in support of his motion. Id. First, Reed argued the 
inconsistencies in Poike's statements established insufficiency olc\ idence. Id. at ^4-^x 
taking the testimony of Ms. Poike in the light more favorable to the State, that that 
statement was made and the car door was opened, that I do not believe that that's a 
si--i.il' Hi1 u !>mpn4M'," ' ; . • u - f ' i i i ' . >. <;• 4 • -'Jf'• l u •• r 
denied Reed's motion, holding Poike's credibility was a question for the jury, and 
Poike's testimony that Reed opened the car door and demanded, that she "get in" 
3 
established "a substantial step towards the possibility of detaining her against her will or 
without any authority." Id at 96-98. 
The trial court instructed the jury as to the elements of attempted child kidnapping 
and attempted lewdness involving a child, the lesser-included offense. R. 157-58; 160. 
The trial court also instructed the jury as to the statutory definitions of intentionally and 
knowingly. R. 161. In Reed's closing argument, he argued Poike's testimony was not 
credible. R. 227:48-55. Regardless, her testimony that he "opened the car door and told 
her to get it" did not "constitute a substantial step towards accomplishing a child 
kidnapping." Id at 56-57. Following deliberation, the jury found Reed guilty of 
attempted child kidnapping. R. 179; 227:72. On July 26. 2005, the trial court sentenced 
Reed to an indeterminate term of 3 years to life and granted credit for time served. R. 
203-08. On August 2, 2005, Reed filed his notice of appeal. R. 209-10. On August 24, 
2005, the Utah Supreme Court transferred Reed's case to this Court. R. 220. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Evidence Presented By the State: 
On August 12, 2004, twelve-year-old Poike was walking her dog west along the 
north sidewalk of 500 South. R. 226:22-23; State's Exhibit 7. She was walking to 
Franklin Elementary School. Id, at 23. In her testimony, Poike described her dog as a 
"pretty big" "golden retriever-mutt mix." Id. at 44, 48. She also described her encounter 
with Reed. Id. at 22-30. When she was walking past the Post Street Tot Lot Park, 
located on the northeast corner of Post Street and 500 South, she saw a four-door car 
parked across the street facing the same direction she was. Id. at 24-25, 33, 36; State's 
4 
Lxii^; here was one person in the car and he was sitting in the driver" s seal R 
226:2* " rhenM-.sniPt-r-sidrwiT . - 4. ' ' ] • •• 
The man in the car -"yelled out. i le\, "hlt |ed| himself up/" and stalled "playing with" 
the zipper on his pant
 ±±L. „; „/-. .;.; • , \\ :.ei. roike saw this, she "got scared,'" "looked 
away," and "kept walking." hi at 25-26, 35. 
Poike walked past the lot 1 oi Park, across Post Street, and "a bit" farther. Id at 
3o: Mate s i.\!:-:--: . ... .»hw -....ii^.;. ,;^ iiiaii urove past her on the same side oi <ae 
street as she was on and stooped at "the next corner " v In. l v as the ,vr:vr . >f 1 ()<>0 W s>\ 
and 500 South. R. 226:26, 36; State's Exhibit 7. \\ hen the car slopped, it was "[n]ot that 
clo^e" t - r.c.. :* 2..- n *• as anout as lar IIOJI. net ».> u^ ;\iek oi me courtroom was 
as she testified. Id at 38. She did not want to get any closer to the car and she started 
thinking about crossing 500 South or getting away. Id. at 37. Then, the man "reach[ed] 
0\ ei u- ,.ic : .i-j^Cch. opened liu ; i_... . ..v., door, and "wnijU. " i i , im or ""(ict in Hie 
car /" in "a demanding wax h1 :; ""• "^ NM(* '\ :: r- -rnivd" .nul "ran :u i . ^ ' ' 
500 South and into the alley just east of the house at 965 West 500 South. Id. at 28; 
Stale s i^xnin. ere, sne 'saw a car at the end oi me alley . K, _ Jo: 3 . 4 ,, She did 
not "know if it was [the same] car," but she thought it iniglii IK\ - - **' e ran to the hons. it 
965 West 500 South, which was her friend's house. Id. at 29-30. 41: State's Exhibit 7. 
Her fc'li •••n.i • _. ,i. a epciia; L;_ ,.. ,1K. :>iiu .,;a\ [ ed j outside a^  | tier Inend s 
grandmother] called the p o 1 i ct* * ! » ^ ^ (r') (). 
Lloyd Ferguson, who lived directly across the street to the south of the Tot Lot 
Park at v.), w ^ J; -. .Nuuin. witnessed l\nkc s encounter with the man from his front 
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porch. Id at 76; State's Exhibit 7. Ferguson said he saw Poike walking west on 500 
South "with her dog." R. 226:76, 79. A man in a car headed east stopped "right there in 
front of [his] house" and spoke to Poike. Id at 76-77, 79. Poike looked at the man, 
shook her head, and "kept on walking." Id at 77, 79-80. The man in the car "flipped" a 
U-turn so he was driving west on the same side of the street as Poike, drove passed Poike 
and the stop-ahead sign, and stopped at the stop sign at the corner of 1000 West and 500 
South. IcL at 77, 81-82; State's Exhibit 7. The man "kept looking back," possibly "in the 
rear view mirror." R. 226:82. Ferguson could not hear what was going on, but he never 
saw the man turn his head or body around or open the car door. Id at 83-84. Poike 
reached the stop-ahead sign "directly across the street from the house" at 965 West 500 
South and, "the next thing you know, she runs across the street" right "where the 
driveway is." Id. at 77, 83; State's Exhibit 7. The man in the car then "turned the 
corner" and "almost wiped out another car when he was turning the corner to take off." 
R. 226:77. 
Deanna Talbott, the grandmother of Poike's friend who lived at 965 West 500 
South, testified Poike came "pounding on the door" of her granddaughter's house, 
opened the door, and entered before she even "got off the couch." Id at 48, 53. Poike 
was "hysterical." Id at 48, 53-54. She was crying and shaking and her voice was 
strained. Id. at 49. She told Talbott she had been walking by the Tot Lot Park with her 
dog when: 
[a] man pulled over and said, 'Get in the car.' She kept 
walking, and she was going across the street from my 
granddaughter's house, and he opened the door, the back door 
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on the passenger side, and told her to get in, and she didn't. 
She run across the street, and she was going to go down the 
alley that goes down alongside my granddaughter's house. 
And she saw him go by the other end of the block, so she 
come running—that's when she came in the house. 
IdL at 49-50; see kL at 54-55. 
Officer Joseph Schirle, who responded to Talbott's call, arrived about ten minutes 
later. Id. at 31, 56, 86. He said Poike described the man "as having black hair" in "a 
Mohawk style." Id at 41. He drove her to look at a suspect and she identified Reed as 
the man in the car. Id at 31-32, 86-87. Officer Catherine Schoney interviewed Poike on 
August 13 and August 16. Id, at 58. She said Poike again described the man as having 
black hair and a Mohawk. Id at 42, 68. 
Officer Schoney also interviewed Reed on August 12. Id at 59. At the time, Reed 
had blond, greased-back hair. Id at 60, 70; State's Exhibits 2, 3; Defendant's Exhibit 4-
b. Initially, Reed said he did not "know anything about" the case. R. 226:62. After more 
questioning, Reed said he "pulled over," but "did not talk to [Poike]." Id at 63. He 
"thought of exposing [him]self," put his hand "down at [his] zipper," and "yelled, 'Hey,'" 
to "get her attention." Id at 63-64, 68. He then "stopped" and "circled around the block 
to do it again." Id. He stopped the car "a block" ahead of her. Id. Then Poike "took off' 
so he "took off and "just left." Id at 63-64, 66. When Officer Schoney asked Reed 
whether he opened the car door and told Poike to get in, he said, "'No, no, I did not. I 
swear to God I did not open the car door and tell her to get in.'" Id at 64. Thereafter, he 
repeatedly denied opening the car door or telling Poike to get in and offered to take a 
polygraph test to prove it. Id. at 65, 69. When asked why Poike would say he opened the 
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door and told her to get it, Reed said, '"Maybe she's scared. Maybe she wants me 
arrested for sure, but, no."' Id at 71-72. 
Detectives Cody Lougy and David Harris impounded and searched the car, which 
belonged to Reed's girlfriend, Rebecca Fehse. Id at 91; R. 227:30-31. The State called 
Detective Harris as a rebuttal witness after the defense rested. R. 227:29. Detective 
Harris testified that during the impound search he found a knife and a canister of mace or 
pepper spray. Id at 32. He also found a baseball bat "[o]n the floor of the car behind the 
front seat." Id 
B. Evidence Presented By the Defense: 
Reed took the stand and admitted he had been convicted of providing false 
information to a police officer in 1999. R. 226:101. He then testified that on the 
afternoon of August 12, 2004, he had the blond, greased-back hairstyle depicted in 
State's Exhibits 2 and 3 and Defendant's Exhibit 4-b. Id. at 100-01. That day, he was 
job-hunting in Fehse's car and was "in a fairly good mood." Id. at 101, 119, 122. He did 
not drive Fehse's car often, but he kept some clothes in the trunk. Id at 125. Fehse kept 
a baseball bat and a can of mace in the car for protection. Id at 123. He did not recall 
any towels in the backseat. Id. at 124. 
While job-hunting, Reed "got kind of lost" in the vicinity of 900 West and 500 
South. Id at 101. As he was driving east on 500 South, he saw Poike walking west with 
her dog and "pulled off the side of the road." Id. at 102-03. Looking for a thrill or a 
rush, he decided to expose himself to her. Id at 119. He shifted so his "belt line was 
above the door," put his "hand on [his] belt buckle and the tip of [his] zipper between 
8 
[his] fingers," and "said, 'Hey.'" Id. at 104-05. He did not pull the zipper down. Id. 
Poike "glanced at" him briefly and kept walking. IdL at 105. Because Poike ignored him, 
Reed did not get the thrill or rush he was seeking. Id. at 119. 
Reed "flipped a U-turn" and "drove west down the street.. . a block and a half, to 
the stop sign" at 1000 West and 500 South. Id at 105; State's Exhibit 7. He stopped at 
the stop sign for ten to fifteen seconds to check "the street signs trying to find out exactly 
where [he] was." R. 226:106. He also "glanced in [his] mirror a couple of times just to 
see if there was any traffic behind [him]." Id He thought about trying to expose himself 
to Poike again, but he "realized it was a bad idea" and decided not to. Id at 106-07. 
While looking in his rearview mirror, he saw Poike, who was "about half to three 
quarters" up the block, "run across the street." Id at 107. Reed denied opening a car 
door or ordering Poike to "Get in" or "Get in the car." Id at 107-08. 
On cross-examination, Reed admitted his "forthrightness" during his interview 
with Detective Schoney "was pretty gradual." Id at 109. During the interview, he 
initially denied knowing anything about the encounter, but then gradually admitted he 
saw Poike, pulled over, and attempted to expose himself to her. Id at 109-10. He also 
admitted he circled the block to try to expose himself to her again. Id at 110-13, 116. At 
the time he testified, Reed did not remember going around the block. Id at 111-13, 116-
18. He said he may have told Detective Schoney he circled the block because he "was 
upset and was being drilled with questions." Id. at 116-18. During his interview with 
Detective Schoney, Reed consistently denied opening the car door and telling Poike to 
get in the car. Id at 112, 126. He knew telling a child to get in his car "would not be 
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looked at as anywhere the same kind of thing as a simple flashing." Id. at 114. He told 
Detective Schoney that he felt stress about losing his job and that stress "was enough" to 
make him "go a little bit psycho." IcL at 120-21, 125. Occasionally, he felt "so stressed 
out and rejected" that he thought about "hurting somebody." Id. at 121. 
Fehse testified she was Reed's fiance and she and Reed had one son together. R. 
227:22. On August 12, 2004, she owned the car depicted in State's Exhibit 4-a. Id at 23. 
She kept shoes and towels in the car. Id. She also left a baseball bat under the driver's 
seat, and a knife and some pepper spray in the glove box as weapons. Id. at 24. She 
usually kept the bat in the trunk, but moved it under the seat in August or September after 
two incidents where she was threatened in her car. IdL On cross-examination, Fehse said 
she loved Reed enough to overlook the charged incident. Id. at 25. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court will reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when it concludes as a 
matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction. It will view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict and reverse if the evidence is so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. Here, the marshaled evidence 
was insufficient to prove the substantial step element of attempted child kidnapping. 
To prove Reed engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the 
commission of child kidnapping, the State had to show his conduct strongly corroborated 
either his intent to commit child kidnapping or that he acted with an awareness that his 
conduct was reasonably certain to result in child kidnapping. The marshaled evidence, 
10 
however, was so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that Reed's conduct constituted a substantial step toward 
the commission of child kidnapping. It is unreasonable to conclude that by opening the 
car door and saying "Get in," Reed intended to induce or acted knowing his conduct 
might reasonably result in inducing a 12-year-old girl to abandon her plans and her large 
dog and run half a city block past six neighbors' houses to get into a stranger's car. 
Rather, as we know from his opening statement and from his testimony, the evidence 
suggests Reed's intent was not to commit child kidnapping, but to get a rush or a thrill by 
frightening Poike into running away. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT REED 
WAS GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED CHILD KIDNAPPING 
This Court will "reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when" it concludes 
"as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." State v. 
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136,11 10, 2 P.3d 954 (citations omitted). It will "view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict," and "will reverse only if the 
evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.'" Id (citations 
omitted). Though the burden of establishing insufficiency of the evidence "is high/' 
however, "it is not impossible." Id. (citations omitted). This Court "will not make 
speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence." Id. (citations omitted). "Every element of 
the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citation omitted). In 
11 
other words, "[t]o affirm the jury's verdict," this Court "must be sure the State has 
introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." IdL (citation 
omitted); see also Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 1118; State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368,1117, 
993 P.2d 232. 
To succeed on a claim of insufficient evidence, the defendant "'must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 
30,1113, 25 P.3d 985 (citations omitted). Proper marshaling requires the appellant to 
present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley 
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis in 
original). "After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id 
When reviewing the marshaled evidence, this Court will "not sit as a second trier 
of fact." Boyd, 2001 UT 30 at H16. "'"It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh 
the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.'"" Id. (emphases and 
citations omitted); see State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) ("When the 
evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of 
both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence."). Thus, 
"[s]o long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which 
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, [this Court's] 
inquiry stops." Boyd, 2001 UT 30 at HI6; see State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 
12 
1991) (noting mere existence of conflicting evidence does not warrant reversal). Instead, 
this Court will simply "'assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting the 
verdict."' Boyd, 2001 UT 30 at U16 (citation omitted); see State v. Chaney, 1999 UT 
App 309,1130, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We may not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, 
but instead 'assume that the jury believed the evidence and inferences that support the 
verdict'" (citation omitted)). 
In this case, Reed raised his motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence at 
the close of the State's case-in-chief. R. 226:94. Thus, this Court should consider only 
the evidence raised by the State in its case-in-chief when deciding whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support Reed's conviction. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 
22,1J40, 70 P.3d 111 ("'A defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the 
conclusion of the State's case in chief requires the trial court to determine whether the 
defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in his defense.'" (citations 
omitted); State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,1J9, 988 P.2d 949 (limiting review of 
sufficiency of evidence in "appeal focuse[d] on the denial of the motion to dismiss at the 
close of the State's case-in-chief. . . to the evidence adduced by the prosecution in its 
case-in-chief," and holding "evidence presented by the defendant. . . [is] not relevant to 
our inquiry"); State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 573-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (finding prima 
facie case based on facts established at close of State's case-in-chief). Accordingly, the 
marshaled evidence is as follows: 
1. On August 12, 2004, twelve-year-old Poike was walking her dog west along 
the north sidewalk of 500 South. R. 226:22-23; State's Exhibit 7. She was walking to 
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Franklin Elementary School. Id at 23. Lloyd Ferguson, who lived directly across the 
street to the south of the Tot Lot Park at 937 West 500 South, saw Poike walking west on 
500 South "with her dog." Id at 76, 79; State's Exhibit 7. 
2. Poike's dog was a "pretty big" "golden retriever-mutt mix." R. 226:44, 48. 
3. When Poike was walking past the Tot Lot Park, located on the northeast corner 
of Post Street and 500 South, she saw a four-door car parked across the street facing the 
same direction she was. Id. at 24-25, 33, 36; State's Exhibit 7. There was one person in 
the car and he was sitting in the driver's seat. R. 226:25, 27. The passenger-side window 
was the only window rolled down. Id. at 34. The man "yelled out, 4Hey,'" "lift[ed] 
himself up," and started "playing with" the zipper on his pants. Id, at 25, 33-34. When 
Poike saw this, she "got scared," "looked away," and "kept walking." Id. at 25-26, 35. 
4. Ferguson saw a man in a car headed east stop "right there in front of [his] 
house" and speak to Poike. Id at 76-77, 79. Ferguson said Poike looked at the man, 
shook her head, and "kept on walking." Id at 77, 79-80. 
5. Poike said she walked past the Tot Lot Park, across Post Street, and "a bit" 
farther. Id at 36; State's Exhibit 7. The man drove past her on the same side of the street 
as she was on and stopped at "the next comer," which was the corner of 1000 West and 
500 South. R. 226:26, 36; State's Exhibit 7. When the car stopped, it was "[n]ot that 
close" to her. R. 226:27. It was about as far from her as the back of the courtroom was 
as she testified. Id. at 38. 
6. Ferguson said the man in the car "flipped" a U-turn so he was driving west on 
the same side of the street as Poike, drove passed Poike and the stop-ahead sign, and 
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stopped at the stop sign at the corner of 1000 West and 500 South. Id, at 77, 81-82; see 
State's Exhibit 7. 
7. Poike said she did not want to get any closer to the car and she started thinking 
about crossing 500 South or getting away. R. 226:37. Then, the man "reach[ed] over to 
the backseat," opened the "right-back door," and "yelled, 'Get in'" or '"Get in the car,'" 
in "a demanding way." Id at 26-28, 39-40. Poike "felt scared" and "ran across" 500 
South and into the alley just east of the house at 965 West 500 South. Id. at 28; State's 
Exhibit 7. There, she "saw a car at the end of the alley." R. 226:29, 41. She did not 
"know if it was [the same] car," but she thought it might be, so she ran to the house at 
965 West 500 South, which was her friend's house. Id at 29-30, 41; State's Exhibit 7. 
8. Ferguson said the man "kept looking back," possibly "in the rear view mirror." 
R. 226:82. Ferguson could not hear what was going on, but he never saw the man turn 
his head or body around or open the car door. Id at 83-84. Poike reached the stop-ahead 
sign "directly across the street from the house" at 965 West 500 South and, "the next 
thing you know, she runs across the street" right "where the driveway is." Id. at 77, 83; 
State's Exhibit 7. The man in the car then "turned the corner" and "almost wiped out 
another car when he was turning the corner to take off." R. 226:77. 
9. Poike said Talbott "opened the door" and she "stay[ed] outside as [Talbott] 
called the police." Id at 30. 
10. Talbott said Poike pounded at the door, opened the door, and entered before 
she even "got off the couch." Id at 48, 53. Poike was "hysterical." Id at 48, 53-54. She 
was crying and shaking and her voice sounded strained. Id at 49. Poike said she had 
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been walking by the Tot Lot Park with her dog when: 
[a] man pulled over and said, 'Get in the car.' She kept 
walking, and she was going across the street from my 
granddaughter's house, and he opened the door, the back door 
on the passenger side, and told her to get in, and she didn't. 
She run across the street, and she was going to go down the 
alley that goes down alongside my granddaughter's house. 
And she saw him go by the other end of the block, so she 
come running—that's when she came in the house. 
Id at 49-50; see kL at 54-55. 
11. Officers Schirle and Schoney said Poike described the man "as having black 
hair" in "a Mohawk style." Id. at 41, 42, 68. Officer Schirle drove Poike to look at a 
suspect and she identified Reed as the man in the car. Id. at 31-32, 86-87. 
12. Officer Schoney said Reed had blond, greased-back hair as depicted in State's 
Exhibits 2 and 3, and Defendant's Exhibit 4-b. Id. at 60, 70; State's Exhibits 2, 3; 
Defendant's Exhibit 4-b. 
13. Officer Schoney interviewed Reed on August 12 and said Reed initially 
claimed he did not "know anything about" the case. R. 226:62. After more questioning, 
Reed said he "pulled over," but "did not talk to [Poike]." Id at 63. He "thought of 
exposing [himjself," put his hand "down at [his] zipper," and "yelled, 'Hey,'" to "get her 
attention." Id. at 63-64, 68. He then "stopped" and "circled around the block to do it 
again." Id. He stopped the car "a block" ahead of her. IdL Then Poike "took off' so he 
"took off and "just left." Id at 63-64, 66. 
14. Officer Schoney said that when she asked Reed whether he opened the car 
door and told Poike to get in, he said, "'No, no, I did not. I swear to God I did not open 
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the car door and tell her to get in.'" Id, at 64. Thereafter, he repeatedly denied opening 
the car door or telling Poike to get in and offered to take a polygraph test to prove it. Id, 
at 65, 69. Officer Schoney said that when she asked Reed why Poike would say he 
opened the door and told her to get in, Reed said, "'Maybe she's scared. Maybe she 
wants me arrested for sure, but, no.'" Id, at 71-72. 
15. Detective Cody Lougy impounded and searched the car, which belonged to 
Reed's girlfriend, Rebecca Fehse. Id, at 91. 
This evidence is insufficient to establish attempted child kidnapping. 
An actor commits child kidnapping if the actor 
intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law, and by 
any means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or 
transports a child under the age of 14 without the consent of 
the victim's parent or guardian, or the consent of a person 
acting in loco parentis. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1(1) (2003). 
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt 
to commit a crime if he: 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the crime; and 
(b)(i) intends to commit the crime; or 
(b)(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of 
the crime, he acts with an awareness that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause that result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial 
step if it strongly corroborates the actor's mental state as 
defined in Subsection (l)(b). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (Supp. 2005). 
"In order for conduct to constitute a substantial step, there must be more than mere 
preparation." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1157 (Utah 1991). Rather, conduct 
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constitutes a substantial step only "if it strongly corroborates the actor's mental state as 
defined in Subsection (l)(b)" of the attempt statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(2). For 
example, in Johnson, the evidence showed the defendant "purchased counterfeit crank 
from undercover officers," but did not show "what she did or attempted to do with it." 
Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1157. Since there was no evidence that she actually "attempted to 
administer the substance" to her husband, the evidence did not establish the substantial 
step needed to support a conviction for attempted first degree murder of her husband. Id. 
Alternatively, in State v. O'Brien, 2003 UT App 419, 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 264, 
the defendant was illegally armed and driving a stolen vehicle, he led the officer on a 
high-speed chase, a shot was fired from inside the vehicle he was driving, he emerged 
from the vehicle holding a handgun and ran from the officer on foot, he sang a song about 
killing cops with handguns when he was apprehended, and the investigation revealed a 
bullet hit the officer's windshield at throat level. O'Brien, 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 264 at 
*3-*4. This Court held these facts established the substantial step needed to support a 
conviction for attempted aggravated murder of the officer. Id. at *3. 
Similarly, in West Valley City v. Decker, 2000 UT App 97, 2000 Utah App. 
LEXIS 221, the defendant "removed some photographs from the City's file and hid them 
between two telephone books." Decker, 2000 Utah App. LEXIS 221 at *1 . The 
defendant "later picked up the telephone books and left the building, unaware that City 
employees had retrieved the photographs." Id. This Court held these facts established 
the substantial step needed to support a conviction for attempted theft of the photographs. 
Id at * l-*2; see Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 220 (Utah 1993) (holding evidence that 
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defendant set mattress ablaze, firefighter saw nothing on mattress to prohibit spread of 
flames, and arson investigator said mattress fire could destroy building, established 
substantial step to support use of attempted aggravated arson as aggravating 
circumstance); State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1989) (holding defendant's 
entry into home with sawed-off shotguns established substantial step needed for attempt 
element of aggravated robbery); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 593-94 (Utah 1988) 
(holding evidence that defendant accosted victim with knife and club and demanded to 
know where she kept her silver and gold established substantial step needed for attempt 
element of aggravated robbery); State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295, 295-96 (Utah 1986) 
(holding evidence that defendant had his head under hood of truck he did not own, 
walked away when confronted, returned with drawn knife, demanded that victim hand 
over keys, ordered victim to lie on ground, and "slashed" at victim when he refused, 
established substantial step needed for attempt element of aggravated robbery); State v. 
Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (noting evidence that defendant 
aimed shotgun for five to seven seconds before firing at victim established substantial 
step needed for attempted criminal homicide). 
In this case, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Reed "engage[d] in conduct 
constituting a substantial step toward commission o f child kidnapping, the State had to 
show his conduct "strongly corroborate]^]" either his intent to commit child kidnapping 
or that he acted "with an awareness that his conduct was reasonably certain" to result in 
child kidnapping. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(l)(b), (2). A defendant acts with intent to 
commit the crime when it is his "conscious objective or desire" to commit the crime. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (2003). A defendant acts knowingly, as defined by the 
attempt statute, "when causing a particular result is an element of the crime" and "he acts 
with an awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-101(l)(b)(ii); see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2). Thus, the State had to 
prove Reed's conduct "strongly corroborate[d]" either his "conscious objective or desire" 
to seize, confine, detain, or transport Poike without authority of law or the consent of her 
parents, or that he acted "with an awareness that his conduct was reasonably certain" to 
result in seizing, confining, detaining, or transporting Poike without authority of law or 
the consent of her parents. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(l)-(2); Utah Code Ann. § 76-
4-101(l)(b); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1(1). The marshaled evidence, however, was 
"so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt'" that Reed's conduct constituted a substantial step toward child 
kidnapping. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136 at HIO (citations omitted). 
It is questionable whether Reed actually opened the car door and said "Get in," as 
Poike claimed. At trial, Poike remembered very few details about the car; she could not 
recall exactly what Reed said when he opened the door; her testimony about the direction 
the car was facing was unlikely and was contradicted by Ferguson; her testimony that 
Talbott opened the door for her and she stayed outside while Talbott called the police was 
contradicted by Talbott; she described Reed's hair as a black Mohawk, even though his 
hair was blond and greased back; and her testimony that the man told her to get into the 
car only the second time he stopped was inconsistent with her previous statements. R. 
226:24-28, 30, 33-34, 36, 39-42, 48-50, 53-55, 68, 76-77, 79; State's Exhibits 2, 3; 
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Defendant's Exhibit 4-b. Collectively, this evidence suggests Poike's memory may have 
been tainted by the stress of the encounter, causing her to recall the encounter as worse 
than it actually was. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-89 (Utah 1986) ("Contrary to 
much accepted lore, when an observer is experiencing a marked degree of stress, 
perceptual abilities are known to decrease significantly."). Thus, Poike's testimony that 
Reed opened the car door and told her to "Get in" is questionable, especially since it was 
directly contradicted by Ferguson, who was not under the same stress as Poike and who 
never saw Reed turn around or open the car door. R. 226:83-84. 
Even assuming Reed opened the car door and said "Get in," however, it is not 
reasonable to conclude this conduct strongly corroborated that Reed intentionally or 
knowingly acted to commit child kidnapping. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1 )-(2); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(l)-(2); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1(1). Reed said during 
his opening statement and during his testimony that his intent during the encounter was 
not to kidnap Poike, but to get a thrill or a rush by startling her. R. 226:17, 119. The 
marshaled evidence strongly corroborates this intent, rather than the mental state required 
by the attempt statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(l)-(2). 
All of Reed's actions were counterproductive to kidnapping. He selected a 
neighborhood full of people, at least one of whom was on a front porch watching, and at 
least occasional cars. R. 226:23, 29-30, 41, 76-77; State's Exhibit 7. He was directly 
across the street from Poike the first time he stopped, but, according to Poike's testimony, 
he did not induce her to get into the car then. R. 226:24-25, 33,36. Instead, he tried only 
to expose himself to her. Id. at 25-26, 35. Reed then made a U-turn, bringing himself 
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right next to Poike, but he did not stop or induce her to get into the car then either. R. 
226:26, 36, 77, 81-82. Instead, he drove right past Poike and kept driving until he 
reached the stop sign at the end of the block, thereby putting six houses (three on either 
side of the street) between him and his intended victim, and increasing the likelihood that 
people in the intersection would witness or interrupt the supposed kidnapping. IcL at 26-
27, 36, 38, 77, 81-82; State's Exhibit 7. 
More important, for Reed to have committed child kidnapping from his position at 
the end of the block, as he was charged with attempting to do, he would have had to 
induce Poike to abandon her plans and her "pretty big" dog; run half a city block past six 
houses, at least one of which belonged to a friend of hers; and get into his vehicle without 
crying out or otherwise drawing attention to herself. R. 226:26, 29-30, 36, 41, 44, 48, 77, 
81-83; State's Exhibit 7. Such a feat would have required Reed, at the very least, to get 
out of the car, display some kind of force or weapon, or otherwise threaten or chase 
Poike. See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1157 (holding evidence insufficient to establish 
substantial step toward first degree murder where evidence showed defendant purchased 
counterfeit crank but did not show she attempted to administer it to her husband). Any of 
these actions may have represented a substantial step because they would have strongly 
corroborated that Reed actually intended to commit or was acting with an awareness that 
his conduct was reasonably certain to result in child kidnapping. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-4-101(l)-(2). But Reed did none of these things. R. 226:26-28, 39-40, 83-84. 
Instead, according to Poike, Reed simply opened the car door and said "Get in." 
Id. This did not constitute a substantial step because Reed knew his actions were not 
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going to induce a 12-year-old girl to abandon her plans and her dog and run half a city 
block past six neighbors' houses to get into a stranger's car. R. 226:26, 29-30, 36, 41, 44, 
48, 77, 81-83; State's Exhibit 7. Rather, as asserted by Reed in his opening statement and 
his testimony, the evidence suggests he was just trying to get a rush or a thrill. R. 226:17, 
119. Poike did not give him the reaction he was seeking when he tried to expose himself 
to her—she just ignored him and kept walking. Id Consequently, he tried again and this 
time used an approach more likely to get the reaction he intended. Id. By opening the 
car door and saying "Get in," he caused Poike to do exactly what he wanted her to do— 
become frightened and run away, thereby giving him the thrill he was seeking. Id at 17, 
28,77,83, 119. 
Thus, this Court should reverse Reed's conviction for attempted child kidnapping 
because there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. Instead, this Court 
should enter a conviction for attempted lewdness involving a child, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 (2003) and Utah Code Ann. § 
76-4-101. 
If... an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine 
that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense... the verdict or 
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (2003). At trial in this case, Reed admitted he was guilty 
of attempted lewdness involving a child, and the trial court submitted attempted lewdness 
involving a child to the jury as a lesser-included offense. R. 179; 226:16. 
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CONCLUSION 
Reed respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for attempted child 
kidnapping, and to enter a judgment of conviction for the lesser-included offense of 
attempted lewdness involving a child. 
SUBMITTED this 2S**day of November, 2005. 
LORKf.SEP 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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MR. FISHER: No further witnesses, Your Honor. At 
this time the State would rest. 
THE COURT: The State has rested. 
Ms. Remal, are you ready to proceed? 
MS. REMAL: I am. I would like to make a matter of 
record outside the presence of the jury, so I wonder if we 
could excuse them. 
THE COURT: Let's take a five-minute recess, just 
enough time to get you comfortable before we bring you back in. 
(Jurors exit the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Okay. Let the record reflect that the 
jurors are not present in the courtroom. The State has rested. 
Ms. Remal? 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I would move the Court to 
dismiss the case against Mr. Reed for insufficiency of evidence 
or lack of establishing a prima facie case at this point. I 
would, in support of that motion, would point to a couple of 
different things: 
Number one, it appears to me that there are a number 
of inconsistencies in the various statements that Ashley Poike 
has made about the incident that occurred on August 12th. 
Number one is about the description of the defendant, and I 
would ask the Court to refer to State's Exhibit 2 and 3 and 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 4, which are photographs of Mr. Reed. 
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She described to Detective Schoney that the 
individual who she interacted with that day had black hair and 
a mohawk. I would observe in those photographs he appears to 
be mostly blond and not having a hairstyle that I would say is 
a mohawk. 
Secondly, there are different variations about what 
she said about where it was that she crossed the street. It's 
my recollection that Ms. -- Ms. Talbott indicated that she told 
her that she had gotten up to the corner, almost to the corner, 
and came back. She indicated to us today that she was closer 
to the middle of the street as I recall. And Mr. Ferguson 
indicated he saw her cross right about the middle of that 
block. 
There are apparently a couple of different statements 
about what statement the defendant or what things he said to 
her when he was parked in that first location closer to 
Mr. Ferguson's house. She indicated today that he said, "Hey," 
and that was all. According to Ms. Talbott, she indicated on 
that date that she said something about getting into the car at 
that time. I would submit that those kinds of inconsistencies 
do not support going forward with the case at this point. 
Secondly, the charge, of course, is attempted child 
kidnapping. Attempt, of course, requires a substantial step be 
taken by an individual, and I would submit to the Court that 
even if taking the testimony of Ms. Poike in the light more 
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favorable to the State, that that statement was made and the 
car door was opened, that I do not believe that that's a 
substantial step to the accomplishment of child kidnapping, so 
for those reasons I would move to dismiss for insufficiency of 
evidence. 
THE COURT: With regards to your first point, yes, 
there are inconsistencies, and but there are inconsistencies 
usually in every case. There's are inconsistencies with the 
fact that she said he had dark hair. I don't know why, but I 
do have testimony to the effect that she identified -- she was 
taken within a short amount of time to an individual stopped in 
a car, and a car that she identified -- well, she -- of a 
description that she had given, that she identified the 
defendant as the individual --at least, I heard testimony from 
officers that this is the defendant, or this is the individual 
that she identified as the individual that committed these 
alleged acts. So I think the identification is good. 
Yes, there is a discrepancy as to where she crossed 
the road and the direction of where the car was pointing, but I 
think those ares discrepancies that I think the jury is going 
to have to deal with, so I deny your motion based on those 
grounds. 
Would you like to respond just so there's a record in 
regards to the dismissal, because the argument is there isn't a 
prima facie case in regards to the attempted kidnapping. 
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MR. FISHER: Well, I think Your Honor's --
THE COURT: Well, I think substantial step towards. 
MR. FISHER: Yes. Your Honor has spelled out most 
points I would make. 
With regard to the issue of substantial step, I think 
that the Court has to look at the overall circumstances, and 
that would include that we're talking about a young girl, we 
are talking about an attempt of a child kidnapping. 
Whether throwing open a door and ordering an adult to 
get in would be a substantial step might get to the level of 
questioning that issue, but when you're talking about a 
12-year-old frightened child, using a demanding tone after 
having -- particularly after having instilled fear into that 
child with the initial act or attempted act, I think that 
anybody would say that that would be a - there would be a 
possibility that that child would respond to that command, be 
afraid. And taking the testimony at face value of throwing 
open the door and issuing that kind of a command would be a 
substantial step with a child. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Remal, I agree with the State, and I deny your 
motion. There being a child involved in this, I think that if 
I look at the testimony in the light most favorable to the 
State for purpose of dismissal, I think they have established a 
prima facie case. 
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The evidence I have is that your client opened the 
door and in a demanding voice ordered her to get in the car. 
If she had gotten in the car, even for an instant, that 
probably would have been a kidnapping. I think he made a 
substantial -- at least for the purpose of a prima facie case, 
the opening of the door, and he demanding that she get in is a 
substantial step towards the possibility of detaining her 
against her will or without any authority, so I'm going to deny 
your motion. I think that they have established a prima facie 
case. Okay. All right. Are you ready to proceed? 
MS. REMAL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you want to bring -- are you ready 
right away or do you need a break? 
MS. REMAL: No, we're ready. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's bring the jury back. 
THE CLERK: Mr. Langdon, did we enter No. 5? 
THE COURT: Yes, yes. That was the two vehicles, 4 
and 5. 
MR. FISHER: States 5 and 6 -- you're right, 4 and 5. 
THE COURT: Yes, State's 4 and 5. 
THE BAILIFF: Third district court is back in 
session, be seated. 
THE COURT: Back on the recordl in State of Utah vs. 
David Carl Reed, 0914 ggg. Let the record reflect the jurors 
are back in the courtroom. Defense counsel and defendant is 
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ADDENDUM C 
76-2-103. Definitions, 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surround-
ing his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
76-4-101, Attempt — Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this pan , a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if he: 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commis-
sion of the crime; and 
(b) U) intends to commit the crime; or 
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he 
acts with an awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause 
that result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it 
strongly corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (1Kb). 
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed if the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
76-5-301.1. Child kidnapping. 
(1) An actor commits child kidnapping if the actor intentionally or know-
ingly, without authority of law, and by any means and in any manner, seizes, 
confines, detains, or transports a child under the age of 14 without the consent 
of the victim's parent or guardian, or the consent of a person acting in loco 
parentis. 
(2) Violation of Section 76-5-303 is not a violation of this section. 
(3) Child kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 years and which may be for 
life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406. 
